TORVO.
Autonomous Offensive Security

Autonomous penetration testing that goes deeper than today's AI agents.

The full attack surface - exploited end to end. Only real proven vulnerabilities, never a hallucination, never a false alarm.

Confidential, design-partner briefing2026
What Torvo is
TTactical
OOffensive
RReconnaissance
VVulnerability
OOperations

Torvo penetrates an unseen product end to end and proves every vulnerability it reports.

INPUTYour product: a URL and credentialsFULL ATTACK SURFACE01 · PENETRATEAuthenticated crawl,SPA, API, hidden endpointsCANDIDATE EXPLOITS02 · ATTACKThe agent reasons andattacks every inputVERIFIED FINDINGS03 · CONFIRMA model-free oraclereproduces each oneSEALED EVIDENCE04 · SEALSHA-256 ledger,re-runnable proofOUTPUTOnly proven vulnerabilities, sealed in an audit-ready report
The answer first; the evidence follows02
The problem

Every way to test a product today forces a trade-off, and real vulnerabilities slip through the gap.

Manual pen tests

Deep, but slow

A human expert goes deep, but spends hours probing by hand. It is costly and point-in-time, so everything between tests is blind.

Automated scanners

Continuous, but shallow

They run around the clock, but only pattern-match the surface. They never go deep, stop at the login screen, and bury your team in false positives.

First-gen AI pentesters

Fast, but untrusted

A new wave of autonomous agents, but they hallucinate findings, so someone still has to verify every result by hand.


No tool is deep, continuous, and trustworthy at the same time. That is the gap Torvo is built to close.

The status quo: a choice between depth, coverage, and trust03
What it finds · the full catalog

Every finding maps to the OWASP Top 10, and each has its own confirming oracle.

A01Broken Access Control
Broken object level authorization (BOLA, IDOR)
/probe-bola
OCWE-639
Broken function level authorization, privileged routes
/probe-bola
PCWE-285
Forced browsing, admin route discovery
/auth-idor
PCWE-425
Unvalidated redirect to attacker host (open redirect)
/oracle-openredirect
OCWE-601
A03Injection
SQL injection: error, boolean, time, auth bypass
/oracle-sqli
OCWE-89
NoSQL operator injection
/oracle-nosqli
OCWE-943
OS command injection
/oracle-cmdi
OCWE-78
Cross site scripting: reflected, stored and DOM
/oracle-xss
OCWE-79
Server side template injection
/oracle-ssti
OCWE-1336
Local file inclusion, path traversal
/oracle-lfi
OCWE-98
XML external entity (XXE), out of band confirmed
/oracle-xxe
OCWE-611
CRLF / HTTP response header injection
/oracle-crlf
OCWE-93
XPath injection, boolean differential
/oracle-xpath
OCWE-643
LDAP injection, filter differential
/oracle-ldap
OCWE-90
A10Server Side Request Forgery
SSRF via URL parameter, out of band callback
/oracle-ssrf
OCWE-918
A02Cryptographic Failures
Cleartext transport, HTTP without HTTPS
/tls-headers
MCWE-319
Weak TLS ciphers or protocols, missing HSTS
/tls-headers
MCWE-326
JWT weak signing secret or alg none
/oracle-jwt
OCWE-347
Excessive data exposure, stored secrets leaked
/oracle-dataexposure
OCWE-200
Predictable or weak session identifiers
/oracle-weakid
OCWE-330
A04Insecure Design
Business logic value tampering: qty or price
/probe-insecure-design
PCWE-841
Missing rate limit, brute force, credential stuffing
/probe-insecure-design
PCWE-770
Unrestricted file upload to remote code execution
/oracle-upload
OCWE-434
Race condition / TOCTOU, single-use bypass
/oracle-race
OCWE-367
A07Identification and Authentication Failures
Authentication bypass via SQL injection
/oracle-sqli
OCWE-287
Crackable or weak password hash recovery
/oracle-hashcrack
OCWE-916
JWT forgery, session or token weakness
/oracle-jwt
OCWE-345
No rate limit on login
/probe-insecure-design
PCWE-307
LLM01Prompt Injection
Instruction override or jailbreak, canary (roadmap)
/probe-prompt-injection
PCWE-1427
A05Security Misconfiguration
Missing security headers: CSP, XFO, Referrer-Policy
/tls-headers
MCWE-16
CORS credentialed cross-origin exposure
/oracle-cors
OCWE-942
GraphQL introspection and alias-batch abuse
/oracle-graphql
OCWE-943
Verbose errors, default or debug exposure
/tls-headers
MCWE-209
Insecure cookie, Set-Cookie missing Secure flag
/oracle-securecookie
OCWE-614
Web cache poisoning via unkeyed header
/oracle-cachepoison
OCWE-444
A06Vulnerable and Outdated Components
Outdated library or dependency, version fingerprint
/sca-scan
MCWE-1104
A08Software and Data Integrity Failures
Insecure deserialization: Java, PHP, Python, Ruby, .NET, YAML
/oracle-deser
OCWE-502
Mass assignment, privileged field injection
/oracle-massassign
OCWE-915
Prototype pollution, cross-request inheritance
/oracle-protopollut
OCWE-1321
JWT integrity, alg none or weak secret
/oracle-jwt
OCWE-345
Unsigned or untrusted update acceptance
/oracle-deser
OCWE-345
A09Security Logging and Monitoring Failures
No block, rate limit or alert on attack signatures
/probe-logging
PCWE-778
04
Proof · the lab corpus

Across five unseen apps, Torvo confirmed real vulnerabilities in bulk, and not one was a false positive.

34
real vulnerabilities confirmed, zero false positives, in << 1 hour
0false positives
85%found by the agent unaided
Five unseen apps, four architectures
  • bWAPPlegacy PHP portal
  • VAmPIREST API
  • DVWAauthenticated PHP
  • Juice Shopsingle-page app
  • BodgeItunseen Java shop
plus a hardened-twin control and the XBOW-104 benchmark

One unchanged confirmation discipline across every architecture. On VAmPI the agent recovered 8 of 9 planted vulnerability classes, so the zero false-positive rate is not the artifact of a tool that finds nothing.

05
Where we win · competitive assessment

The field is racing on autonomy. Torvo leads on advanced intelligence and auditable proof.

VALIDATEDAUTONOMOUS + AUDITABLENOISY SCANNERSAUTONOMOUS, BUT UNAUDITED01122334455667788991010Autonomy & depth →Auditable proof →OWASP ZAPInvictiPentAGIStrixShannonTORVO.
Positioning vs. publicly described tools, 2026 · no competitor publishes a measured false-positive rate or tamper-evident evidence06
The deliverable

Every engagement ships an audit-ready package, with every finding sealed in tamper-evident proof.

TORVO.SAMPLEPENETRATION TEST REPORTyour-product.comAuthenticated black-box assessment · Oct 2026FINDINGS BY SEVERITYCritical3High5Medium8Low4SEALED FINDING 1 OF 20command_injection · CWE-78CONFIRMED · reproduced 3/3sha256 4e9b1c08…b7d4e2f1prev a7f3…9c21SHA-256SEALEDPage 1 of 42
What's inside
Executive reportRisk summary for leadership, severity at a glance
Technical findingsEvery finding with CWE, severity and affected endpoint
Reproducible PoCsThe exact request and steps to re-run each exploit
Evidence ledgerSHA-256 hash-chained, tamper-evident record
Remediation guidanceFix-by-fix guidance for every confirmed finding
Retest verificationThe oracle re-runs after a fix to prove it is closed
Compliance mappingMapped to OWASP Top 10 and CWE, audit-ready
JSON exportMachine-readable, straight into Jira, CI or your SIEM
Sample report shown · every deliverable is generated for every engagement07
TORVO.

Let's prove it on one of your products.

Design partners

A scoped pilot on a single product. You keep the evidence ledger, whatever we find.

The opportunity

Own the defensible layer of autonomous security, provable trust, at the moment the capability went mainstream.

Confidential08
← → or space